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Posts of the Week: 9/20/10 - 9/26/10
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Posts of the Week: 9/13/10 - 9/19/10
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The Politics of the Anti-China Bill
For the sake of convenience and rabble-rousing I'm going to refer to the Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act as the Anti-China Bill. The bill will essentially allow the US to impose trade sanctions against countries that manipulate their currencies. The best thing written about the bill and Geithner's speech today is from the Economist's Free Exchange: Pundits have been demanding that Mr Geithner pressure China to allow its currency to appreciate against the dollar, and Mr Geithner (reluctantly, one imagines) is rising to heed the call.
. . .
It was American pressure that led the Chinese to de-peg their currency in the first place; recall that they wanted to avoid heated confrontations at the June G20 summit. And American pressure has likely contributed to the recent sharp rise in the yuan (which has appreciated by 1.25% in just the last fortnight), though signs that the Chinese economy is achieving a smoother landing than previously believed have obviously helped.
Persuasion, in other words, is working. . . .
My view is that China recognises the need to let its currency rise, and when economic conditions permit it is willing to move toward gradual appreciation. . . .
Actual trade confrontation, on the other hand, would be very messy. Chinese leaders are explicitly warning that sanctions would be counterproductive. Some American leaders and pundits seem to assume that if persuasion is working, an aggressive policy confrontation would work better.
. . . But there's an election on, and populism is ascendent, and the trade warriors in Congress will have their day. I just hope the legislature holds to its recent pattern of behaviour—all talk and no action. A qualitative analysis of why it matters that it's an election year goes something like this: While the Democrats have been in power the US unemployment rate is hovering around historic highs for a historically long time. Democratic policies have either failed or appeared to have failed to fix the unemployment situation. In a bid to deflect blame for the poor state of unemployment from themselves, the Democrats have chosen an external target: China. Simplified, they claim that unemployment is due to the trade imbalance which is due to an under-valued renminbi.
Supposing that trade tends to be good for the economy and that data shows that manufacturing jobs in the US have been in steady decline since the '50s, one should only be able to make the above argument if they are intellectually dishonest because they arguing for what they should argue for politically even if it is not a real solution. If this is the case, then one would expect that Democrats who sponsored the Anti-China Bill are disproportionately in congressional districts where they are not considered safe in the mid-term elections in November. So I took a look at the congress people who endorsed the Anti-China Bill, and whether or not they are considered to be safe in the November elections according to Real Clear Politics polling.
Of the 146 sponsors of the bill, 103 are Democrats and 43 are Republicans. Of the 43 Republicans, 40 are considered safe, and 3 are in districts that are likely or leaning Republican. Of the 103 Democrats, 47 are in districts considered safe, 23 are in likely/leaning Democrat, 18 are in tossup districts, and 15 are in likely/leaning Republican. The 18 Democratic congressmen in elections that are considered tossups represent half of the total 36 Democratic congressmen in tossup elections, and the 15 Democrats in elections likely/leaning Republican represent half of the 30 total Democrats in those elections.
I think that's some pretty good evidence that quite a few of our elected representatives are being intellectually dishonest with themselves and their constituency. plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose... 
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Posts of the Week: 9/6/10 - 9/12/10
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Comment on the NYT China Clean Energy Subsidies
Stan Abrams has a great post up today on this morning's New York Times article by Keith Bradsher about China's various solar subsidies, On Clean Energy, China Skirts Rules. In his post, Stan enumerates the various subsidies discussed in the article, and he discusses their strengths if they were filed in a WTO complaint. One response to Mr. Bradsher's article: I thought the juxtaposition of US industry complaints with a Chinese entrepreneur's responses, or at least the selection of quotes from a Chinese entrepreneur, definitely painted the alleged Chinese subsidies in a poor light. One response to Stan's post: I had to investigate why export restrictions are such difficult items.
Juxtapositions of Complaints and Responses In response to export subsidies in general, Zhao Feng, a GM at Sunzone, responded that "the world should appreciate the generous assistance of Chinese government agencies to the country’s clean energy industries."
In response to the land use rights, Mr. Zhao responded that "the subsidized land will also help Sunzone afford plans to sell solar panels below cost to poor people in western China."
And in response to official encouragement, Mr. Zhao pointed out that "Our provincial governor has come several times to our plant, just as Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger has made several visits to solar power companies” in California.
Mr. Zhao is not exactly helping his own case here.
Mr. Bradsher only presents one real defense from the Chinese government: China contends "that it is still a developing country struggling to understand its commitments."
Response to Export Restrictions Stan's comment on rare earth metal export restrictions: "Export restrictions on raw materials and currency manipulation are certainly ongoing trade disputes. However, whether either of these practices is a violation on WTO law are hotly debated issues, and if you take a poll of trade lawyers, you would be unlikely to get any sort of consensus opinion. Moreover, proving these allegations in a formal dispute resolution procedure would be quite difficult." I think he is right that proving the allegations is quite difficult because WTO rules allow for export restrictions in certain circumstances including general revenue and conservation. And, in fact, when Beijing imposed export restrictions on rare earth exports, they claimed it was for conservation after "years of over-exploitation that has damaged the country's environment." Export He is also right that the issue is hotly debated. Let's see what the debate is about.
So what are the WTO legal standards for illegal export restrictions under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)? Here's a summary of a summary of GATT rules. The main source for what export restrictions are and are not allowed is Article XI:1 of the 1994 GATT. The summary distinguishes between allowed export duties and disallowed quantitative export restrictions: - Export Duties: Export duties, taxes, and other charges are generally permitted.
- Quantitative Export Restrictions (QER): Includes quotas, bans, minimum prices, and non-automatic licensing requirements on the "exportation or sale for export of any product." Could potentially include prohibitively high export duties, but that's highly debatable. There are exceptions:
- If QERs are applied to relieve temporary shortages;
- If QERs are necessary to spread supplies over a longer period of time;
- If QERs are for price stabilization;
- If QERs reasonably relate to conservation "in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption." And this exception, which is in Article XX(g), cannot be relied on if they are "designed to protect or promote a domestic processing industry."
- And there are also a number of security related exceptions.
If a quantitative export restriction causes the price for domestic production to be lower than in the absence of the restriction, then a subsidy could be found to exist. If a subsidy is found to exist, then a countervailing duty or anti-dumping remedy could be appropriate.
Of particular note by analogy for rare earth metals is that quantitative export restrictions apply to the saleor sale for export. The OPEC countries and their oil quotas have not been tested, but it is argued that OPEC quotas are production quotas and not sale or export quotas. But China's quotas are explicitly export quotas.
So, yeah, this sounds like one difficult situation... 
 
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Debt for Equity Swaps by FIEs in China
[The meat's a few paragraphs down under "In China" header. I just wanted to do the comparative law thing first.]
Given the prevailing gloomy economic climate in the developed world, and market volatility in the developing world, debt for equity swaps have received a lot of coverage over the past couple of years. Debt for equity swaps can be by contract or under a bankruptcy statute, and if in bankruptcy then they can be voluntary or involuntary. The possibility of debt for equity swaps can encourage creditors to lend to riskier borrowers, and involuntary debt for equity swaps in bankruptcy can theoretically help keep interest rates down by allowing creditors the opportunity to take control of, or at least a significant stake in a company if it is forced into bankruptcy. The most famous debt for equity swap is GM's reorganization in bankruptcy. GM was nudged into filing for chapter 11 bankruptcy which allows for the restructuring of a company's debt-holder's interests into equity interests. And if the most senior creditor of a debtor corporation has at least a 33% or higher equity interest in that company following the chapter 11 reorganization, then the reorganization is tax free to the company, shareholders, and creditors. In GM's case, secured creditors received the requisite amount of equity to keep the reorganization tax free. Chapter 11 is a useful mechanism for a debt to equity swap because it allows for a corporation to receive a fresh start while giving the creditors a judicial forum to protect their interests. In ChinaCagman Palmer of Shanghai Nan Guang Law Firm recently wrote an interesting paper on debt for equity swaps in China, Debt-for-Equity Swap and Reorganisation Law in the People's Republic of China. As in the US, there are three types of situations where there might be a debt for equity swap: 1) contractual, out-of-court swaps; 2) voluntary reorganizations in bankruptcy; and 3) involuntary reorganizations in bankruptcy. Mr. Palmer explains each in extreme detail. I'd like to briefly summarize his description of contractual, out-of-court debt for equity swaps by foreign invested enterprises in China.
Contractual Debt for Equity Swaps by FIEs in China The key component of these swaps is that 1) they must comply with any laws, regulations and administrative rules of the PRC, and 2) they must be registered and approved by the SAIC in Beijing, or the SAIC's "local or provincial counterpart at the debtor company's domicile." The swaps must be registered and approved because the swap increases a company's level of registered capital. And since this is Chinese law, you should be asking where is the catch-22? It is in enforcement.
Provisions on restructuring say that contractual debt for equity swaps will be recognized in civil disputes if 1) they are purely consensual, and 2) in compliance with compulsory laws and administrative rules. However, the Supreme Court of the PRC has also ruled that the recognition provisions only apply to domestic enterprises, and not to FIEs. This means that since the laws, regulations and administrative rules do not explicitly allow for debt to equity swaps in FIEs, the approving bodies may not approve them. In effect, an FIE debt to equity swap may not be forced because regulations may not cover them because they may not be able to be enforced. D'oh!
Enter Shanghai. Last year Shanghai introduced measures allowing for debt to equity swaps by FIEs, which should, as long as Shanghai is the domicile of the FIE debtor, make debt to equity swaps in FIEs enforceable in a civil dispute. The Shanghai Department of Commerce should approve a debt to equity swap if the following elements are satisfied: - The swap is a conversion of a registered foreign shareholder loan into the registered capital of the same FIE;
- The registered capital of the FIE has been paid in full and on schedule;
- It has been unanimously approved by all shareholders;
- It meets the requirements of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE);
- The swap agreement state the amount of debt to be canceled in exchange for equity;
- The proper documents proving that the debt meets SAFE requirements has been attached; and
- The change in registered and paid-in capital were processed at the same time.
I think the comparative aspects are interesting. And I'm sure we'll see a national expansion of these rules over time. 
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Posts of the Week: 8/30/10 - 9/5/10
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China Government Sanctions for Violation of Environmental Laws
BNA Daily Report for Executives (subscription only) has an interesting article today that gives 6 examples of ways that various city and provincial governments are discovering and responding to violations of environmental laws.
"Serious Environmental Violations" in Liaoning Province 46 of 74 companies with "serious environmental violations" in Liaoning province will have restricted access to credit at state-owned banks. The province did not identify the companies, the extent of the restriction, or how long the restriction will last.
Penalties for Failing to Meet Energy Intensity Reduction Goals in Guizhou Province Guizhou province created a monitoring system that will monitor energy consumption, and alert companies when their energy consumption nears their monthly quota. Penalties already instituted this year in Guizhou: - Fines and close monitoring for the rest of the year for 32 companies that did not meet their energy intensity reduction goals.
- 71 companies have been shut down this year for using outdated production methods.
- 52 companies have been ordered to suspend operations until they cure their energy consumption issues.
- 14 cement companies have been ordered to change production patterns to rely on off-peak energy.
Jiangsu Promoting Pollution Liability Insurance The promotion of pollution liability insurance is part of Jiangsu's campaign to reduce pollution. Presumably pollution liability insurance will make companies presumptively liable for damages caused by certain types of pollution?
Hubei Fines Paper Company Almost $1 million USD A Hubei paper company, Huahai Zhiye, was fined almost $1 million USD for illegally discharging wastewater through a hidden pipe.
Guangzhou Opens a Pollution Hotline Guangzhou opened a pollution hotline encouraging people to call in and identify polluters, particularly vehicles that emit black smoke. 
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After the Fall of Communism, Why Did Russia Become Democratic and China Remain a Communist State?
A friend emailed me the other day asking for my thoughts on why Russia democratized after the fall of Communism and China did not. My initial, flippant thought is, Russia democratized? But that's too harsh. Let's give Russia the benefit of the doubt that it is a representative democracy, or a republic. Let's also give China the benefit of the doubt and not say "the fall of communism," but instead the beginning of the adoption of market economies. I think there are three factors for why Russia has democratized since the fall of the Soviet Union, and why China has not democratized since the fall of the Gang of Four and the rise of Deng Xiaoping Theory: 1) different solutions to the trilemma of international finance; 2) historical tradition; and 3) the particular circumstances in each country that led to the adoption of market economies. Trilemma of International Finance - International capital mobility;
- Ability to use monetary policy to stabilize the economy; and
- Maintain currency stability.
The US has chosen the first two 1) by allowing Americans to easily invest abroad and by allowing foreigners to easily invest in America, and 2) by using the Federal Reserve to set monetary policy. 3) But at the price of a volatile dollar value which is set by international markets.
Europe has chosen the first and third 1) by allowing Europeans to easily invest abroad and by allowing foreigners to easily invest in Europe, and 3) by maintaining currency stability, at least across the euro zone. 2) But at the cost of nations giving up the ability to use monetary policy to the European Central Bank.
China has chosen the second and third 2) by setting monetary policy, and 3) by maintaining tight control over the exchange rate of the yuan. 1) But at the cost of restricting outbound and inbound international capital mobility to control how much money comes into and goes out of the country.
Russia's policy is closest to the US in practice. 1) There are some restrictions on international capital mobility, but a) they are not as strict as China's, and b) the geographic realities of China and Russia make them more difficult to enforce in Russia's case. 2) and 3) The goal of the Central Bank of Russia is to maintain currency stability, but it has proven ineffective at maintaining currency stability, and is instead focusing on using monetary policy to stabilize the economy (see the link to the "goal of the Central . . .").
When economic policy makers choose to restrict international capital mobility, I think that it necessitates a government with stronger or more authoritarian control over its citizens. And I think a democratically elected government would have a much harder time maintaining legitimacy with such tight controls on capital mobility. That isn't to say that China's economic policy isn't working brilliantly, just that democracy suggests greater freedom, and capital mobility restrictions are a more tangible restriction on freedom than currency pegging and a central bank's tinkering with monetary policy.
Historical Tradition We all know the traditional narrative about government institutions in the West v. those in the East, right?
The historical tradition in the West follows an embrace of an idealized Athens and Rome. Athens became super-rich as the de facto head of the Delian League, and being rich is totally awesome because you have all this cash to make art and pay for plays. People even forget that everybody got pissed at you for being super-rich, and you got your ass handed to you by Spartans in the Peloponnesian War, and twice more by barbarians: one Macedonian, and the other Roman. Rome was super-powerful, and being powerful is awesome because it allows you to dominate others. To be super-rich and super-powerful, the Western tradition dictates that you should be like Rome and/or Athens, and to be like Rome/Athens, we look to their writers. Democracy, or at least a republic, where citizens exercise votes to choose their leaders is considered ideal because Plato wrote about Socrates arguing about topics such as courage, liberty and freedom. But Plato actually believed in philosopher-kings, and when western philosophers started reading all of the awesome Aristotle during the Renaissance that Islamic and Jewish scholars had preserved, they started to totally dig this idea of a real republic which resulted in liberty and freedom, not that fake one that Plato writes about. Then a bunch of well-educated people bought a bunch of printing-presses and had some revolutions. Some were cool, some were creepy, and tradition is preserved.
In the East, Qin Shi Huang unified China through a highly bureaucratic state in which the nobility was replaced by a relatively meritocratic hierarchy of officials who administered the state which begat a major ass-kicking of the other kingdoms during the Warring States period. After Liu Bang successfully exploited Qin and Chu weaknesses, the Han dynasty emulated Qin's bureaucracy. Fast-forward through a couple thousand years of monarchical bureaucracies to the People's Republic China, and what China now has is a single-party, nominal republic with a highly bureaucratic state. Tradition is preserved, but the monarchy has, if you'll allow me some wiggle room, been replaced by the Party.
But what of Russia, that great nation that straddles East and West? As anyone who has ever read Tolstoy's War and Peace can tell you, a) it's long, and b) 19th century Russians really dug French culture. We see Russia's fascination with and eagerness to engage with Europe over the arc of it's history, particularly manifested in 1) the declaration of Moscow as the New Rome under Ivan the Great following the Ottoman conquest of Byzantium in 1453, 2) the military, political and economic reforms of Ivan the Terrible, and 3) a turbulent affair with a pair of Germans. Russia aspired to be a part of the West, and democratic institutions are more in line with the historical traditions of the West, which Russia has engaged with for far longer than the east, than a single-party bureaucracy.
Circumstances at the Inception of the Adoption Market Economies This, I think, is the big one. Fortunately, I think I can describe it less verbosely than the other two.
The collapse of the Soviet Union began with turmoil in the Warsaw Pact allies. The communist countries of Eastern Europe were economically inefficient as a direct result of the command economy. The governments had lost legitimacy because of the form of government. After the Sinatra Doctrine, the Eastern European countries turned to new forms of government that were modeled on representative democracies. When economic inefficiencies finally brought down the Soviet Union in 1991, it was also because the form of government was blamed for the economic inefficiencies. With the form of a highly centralized and all-powerful federal government rendered illegitimate, a new form of government was needed, and because of tradition and the First World's success with representative democracies, the Second World decided to take the democratic route. Of course, this probably could not have been accomplished without the strong personalities of Gorbachev and Yeltsin.
The adoption of a market economy in China began in 1978 when Deng Xiaoping became head of the CPC and guided the Party toward political and economic pragmatism. But it was never the Party or the autocratic government that had lost legitimacy; it was people in the government that had lost legitimacy. Mao Zedong's policy of perpetual revolution had caused the country to economically stagnate, and atrocities were committed under the Gang of Four, but people still believed in Communism, and Deng Xiaoping brought China a socialism with Chinese characteristics: "Poverty is not socialism. To be rich is glorious."
China had not been a world superpower on the order of the Soviet Union post-WWII and prior to the adoption of market reforms. There was not glorious scientific, athletic, and artistic achievement in China in the post-WWII to Deng period. Communism was not associated with poverty, poverty simply existed, and Deng started to bring China wealth under the auspices of Communism. The CPC has not been without its hiccups since 1978, but it has been remarkably successful at maintaining control and legitimacy. 
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Posts of the Week: 8/23/10 - 8/29/10
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China Needs 10 New Yorks Over the Next 20 Years. How Do We Get in the Real Estate Game?
Dan Harris at China Law Blog has been quite bullish on the China healthcare business prospects, particularly pharmaceuticals (see parts one and two). I am not one to disagree, and Chinese pharmaceutical R&D, manufacture, and sales does sound like quite the opportunity. But what if you are not in the enviable position of owning valuable pharma IP? I'd take a wager on construction.
The other day it was revealed that Blackstone was reentering China's real estate market. I was a bit shocked by this news, as I'm sure many others were, because all the signs seem to be pointing towards a real estate bubble in China: 25-30% of commercial and housing space may be sitting vacant, prices seem to be leveling off, and the government has apparently insisted on tightened real estate lending. Intrigued, I delved further and realized that Blackstone was actually investing in a realty developer. Now that makes sense!
A recent piece at Foreign Policy heralds the coming of the Megacities through a collection of charts and graphs of urban changes in China and India over the coming 20 years. Of particular note is that China will require 40 billion square meters of new commercial and residential space over the next 20 years. That is equivalent to 10 New Yorks, or the size of Switzerland. A rising tide might not necessarily lift all boats, but it will surely lift those with the capital necessary to keep building. And a company like Blackstone should be able to provide the financing to a housing developer to ensure that it can reap a healthy profit off of the natural growth of China's urban landscape.
So how does one go about getting into the construction game? Well, construction of anything worthy of a significant foreign investment, such as 1) class A hotels, residential buildings or office buildings, 2) international exhibition centers, 3) large scale theme parks, 4) public gas, heat, water facilities, 5) golf courses, 6) cinemas, 7) refineries, and 8) smaller coal fired plants, falls in the Catalogue of Restricted Foreign Investments. This does not mean that it cannot be done, it just means that the formation of a company that wants to engage in one or more of these types of construction will be subject to a more onerous (read: more lengthy and expensive) review and approval process than other types of foreign investment. This, of course, is in addition to the standard examination and approval procedures (see a "simplified" flow chart). But if you have the time, money and patience, plus some synergies in your portfolio, construction sounds like one hell of an opportunity. 
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The Huawei and Sprint Nextel Deal Seems Innocent Enough
On first impression, the eight Republican Senator's opposition to Huawei's bid to supply Sprint Nextel with telecommunications equipment in the US seemed like a typical political exploitation of xenophobia, particularly in a competitive mid-term election season. But Huawei has had some accusations against them over the years that make them seem more suspect than other Chinese companies. However, I think the nature of this particular business deal does not make it a serious security risk.
Huawei was accused of stealing technology from Cisco, Motorola, and some vendors at a Supercomm show. Cisco's suit against Huawei was dismissed because it was determined that rogue developers were at fault, the 'spy' at the Supercomm show was never prosecuted, and we have yet to see whether the Motorola case has legs. So Huawei's history with corporate espionage is so far undetermined.
Transactions with Huawei have previously run into problems in two other countries. In the US, Huawei was attempting a merger of 3Com and the CFIUS committee found that the merger would pose a threat to national security, but the deal was not blocked. Instead, Huawei voluntarily withdrew their offer. The Indian government has also previously canceled two deals between Huawei and Indian telecom companies because of national security concerns, including BSNL and Sistema Shyam Teleservices Ltd., the Indian unit of Russia's AFK Sistema.
The allegations of corporate espionage have not yet proven true, and while corporate espionage is a criminal issue, the government should not block a deal because it is possible that Huawei might steal technology from Sprint. Sprint should be able to make those determinations on their own as part of their willingness to be supplied by Huawei.
A hardware hack is an unreasonable fear, the risk of technology theft can be dealt with effectively by Sprint's choice to deal or not deal with Huawei, and it's time to realize that the second largest mobile equipment in the world, Huawei, might, might just be after a profit. And if they're the best provider of equipment, then it's a net good if Sprint buys their equipment from Huawei. 
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Richard Pozen's Solution to Solve the US-China Trade Deficit
Robert Pozen wrote an op-ed for the WSJ yesterday arguing that the best way to shrink the trade deficit is for Chinese companies to increase wages, rather than faster yuan appreciation: Bashing Beijing Will Not Help Our Trade Deficit. He argues this because wages are the most expensive input for most of the goods exported from China to the US. And if wages increase, then Chinese will have more money to spend in China resulting in more of China's goods being purchased in China.
He also attacks yuan appreciation as an effective tool for the 3 following reasons: - Exports from China to the US are assembled in China while the component manufacture takes place in other countries. Chinese input costs are typically about 10%, so even a substantial appreciation would not result in a large increase in prices.
- Appreciation of the yuan would push low-end manufacturing to other countries, but the overall exports to the US would be the same, just not from China.
- The volume of high-end exports to the US is driven by competition with Germany and Japan, which depends more on the value of the euro and yen.
There are some significant problems with Mr. Pozen's argument.
First, if Chinese input costs are not significant, then higher wages will have no different effect on the trade deficit than a more valuable yuan.
Second, wage increases would also result in low-end manufacturing migrating to other countries. Also, many of the products manufactured in China for the US market are never sold in China. If wages increase, then Chinese might have more money to spend on the goods, but the goods would not be sold in the Chinese market anyway. The overall US trade deficit would remain the same, and jobs would likely be lost in China because the goods currently being manufactured for the US market cannot likely be re-purposed for the Chinese market.
Third, if the volume of high-end exports from China is driven by competition with Germany and Japan, and the value of the euro and yen is a strong factor in determining which country customers purchase goods from, then surely the value of the yuan would also be a strong factor if it appreciated to its true value due on freely convertible exchange.
Lastly, and most importantly, either a wage increase or an increase in the value of the yuan would produce the same end, but it is impossible to use a stick to force Beijing to raise the minimum wage in China. It is possible and legal to use sanctions against a country if they are manipulating their currency. That is not to say that China is manipulating their currency under the law, but the yuan is certainly undervalued.
Mr. Pozen's real concern is that American politicians' declarations that China is a currency manipulator only provoke resistance, and that they should instead promote higher wages. I certainly agree that yelling in front of cameras that China is a currency manipulator is not the most effective method to get China to act, and I wish Mr. Pozen had restricted his argument to this point because telling China that their workers don't earn enough certainly can't be any more effective.
However, hasn't Washington been fairly effective at getting Beijing to loosen up its currency Policy? It reminds me of the classic and instructive South Park episode when Cartman travels back to 1776 and learns Benjamin Franklin's important policy that a republic can have its cake and eat it too by voting to go to war while being anti-war. In this case, Senator Chuck Schumer and legislative branch can play bad cop, while Timothy Geithner and the executive branch play good cop, and concessions are reached. 
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Posts of the Week: 11/2 - 11/8
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Posts of the Week: 10/26 - 11/1
China Antimonopoly Law Update at China Realtime Report Discussing two interesting lawsuits under the AML, one against China Mobile, and the other against Shanda and Xuanting. Love The One You're With. When China Joint Ventures Make Sense at China Law Blog Dan covers some instances where he thinks JVs are appropriate. A Call For More Transparency In China’s Africa Investments at China Realtime Report China Briefing's Series on Chinese JVs China Joint Ventures as Strategic InvestmentChina Joint Ventures: Legal Due DiligenceChina Joint Ventures: Financial Due DiligencePreparing For Domestic Carbon Trading In China at China Law Update Information on what may be China's first domestic carbon trading market. Looking Under the Hood of the China Deal Machine at Deal Journal Deal Journal getting excited about Volvo, Sino-Swedish relationships, and Qatari gas deals. CIC Gives Rare Tally of Overseas Spending at China Realtime Report It is what it is. Anybody else totally stoked about WSJ's way expanded China coverage? China Antimonopoly Law Series at Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog China’s Antimonopoly Law—One Year DownChina’s Antimonopoly Law—One Year Down: Part 2. China’s new merger review regimeChina’s First Court Decision under the Antimonopoly Law: A Misreading of the Law?Decoding China: Why Its Stock Markets, GDP Aren’t Linked at Deal Journal "A unique characteristic of China’s equity market is the relatively high percentage of nontradable shares held by the central government, local governments and state-owned enterprises. One feature of this system is the transfer of risks to the country’s individual stock investors, causing price aberrations in the stock market, while keeping outsize returns for the government holders of nontradeable shares." Head West, China: An Interview with Private Equity Consultant, Song Jin by Aimee Barnes 
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